Conference Theme

From a culturalist perspective, politics is seen as continuation of culture, but implemented by other means. In the case of science, such a categorical statement would be unfounded, as science is not directly a sphere of culture with a separate cognitive status. The basic issue is an attempt to answer the question whether, on the basis of theory of science, it is possible to examine culture without its social implications. What can we observe and is it a direct function of the external environment, both in the psychological context (beliefs) and in the political context (political regime)? Science is an element of knowledge, and as such it can be useful in solving certain practical problems. On the other hand, it is a sphere of fulfilling group interests, often expressed through represented world views, i.e. ideologies. From this perspective, knowledge resulting from research in the area of broadly-understood humanities represents not only its specific state, but also expectations resulting from the aim to convince the recipients to implement actions contained within the vision of reality delivered to them, where external aspirations are to be implemented as their own (Szahaj, 2004). Nevertheless, we must still be aware of the fact that any scientific inquiry is immersed in the socio-cultural context we know. This is the direction in which research within the paradigm of sociology of knowledge, i.e. the anti-naturalistic concept of understanding culture, is heading. If the goal of science is to explain and predict, then culture understood as a social phenomenon can be interpreted in relation to idiographic features, and not universally. In the second volume of The Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper 2002), when describing sociology of knowledge, Karl Popper pointed out that scientific thought relating to social and political issues never develops in isolation, but in specific social conditions, and is subject to subconscious influences, or influences of which the observer’s logic is no longer aware. Whereas in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper 1959), he wrote that where the interpretation of data and facts changes, rather than the data and facts themselves, we can say that the observer cannot observe anything without earlier assumptions which are a result of learnt theories (theory impregnation thesis). Feyerabend and Kuhn went even further in this view, establishing a necessary and inseparable connection between theory and observation (theory-ladenness).

Assuming that culture always develops in the same way, i.e. by referring to a metaphorical description of reality, the democratic and non-democratic environment itself will remain neutral in identifying its characteristics. The same exegesis of the value of beauty, truth and good (humanities) will be carried out regardless of the political model. However, different social conditions will influence the context of observation or the observer’s/researcher’s worldview. With regard to what we mean by social science, the adopted measurement tools, as well as their results in the form of statistics and correlations, will not be free from implications of past and present experience, even though we want to see them as completely autonomous. However, we know from Bourdieu that the autonomy of social research is a longed-for expectation and that research tools, practices and methods serve as the actual weapons of the dispute. Thus, while research tools can be partially considered to be objective, their use is always intentional. Especially in the case of culture, it is difficult to deviate from the idea that culture is free from goals and interests of social groups. For this reason, cultural policy research will, by definition, provide a context for expected knowledge, albeit described as objective.

Past relations between cultural policies and the democratic and non-democratic order were characterized, to a large extent, by a different cognitive perspective. For the non-democratic regime, it was important both to consolidate power and to license culture, whose creations contrasted with the monopolistic image of reality promoted by the system. In such realities, the art community played a game with the authorities, which resulted in single consents being granted for implementation of creative initiatives. It can also be pointed out that the authoritarian state supported those segments which it did not perceive as a threat to itself. Nowadays, non-democratic regimes have partially liberalized the formula of prohibitions, implementing a controlled cultural policy to a lesser extent, also due to the fact that traditional contestation trends have lost their power due to commercialization of rebellion and absorption of counter-culture, as well as the decreasing interest on the part of democratic societies, focusing on global issues. In the case of past cultural policies of democratic states, there was a strong imperative of freedom, which determined culture along with the changing social habits. The state did not intervene directly, but usually introduced a general framework, filled with artists’ autonomous works. Today, on the other hand, cultural policies preserve a sentimental memory of the former freedom of expression, bending under the stigma of responding to subsequent global threats, treating universally understood order as still worth defending against emerging extremes. The image of global culture is based on defence of the entire material and non-material heritage and participation in the processes of socialization and shaping the imagination of individuals. It can therefore be argued that over the decades it was not cultural policies themselves that changed, but the ideologies that drive them transformed.

Taking the above into consideration, it is worth considering whether we are able to reliably determine the level of influence of the system on the shape of cultural policy. To what extent does criticism of the democratic-liberal paradigm make it possible to interpret decisions concerning culture from the perspective of public policy, and to what extent is it a reflection of the fight for power (politics)? This abovementioned universally accepted paradigm assumed cognitive universality. It went far beyond a description of the political order, because for years it established research patterns aimed at searching for results to justify liberal identity policy or economic neoliberalism. What turned out to be a weakness of liberalism, i.e. the inability to implement its own agenda, found a reflection in culture. Culture was recognized by the liberals as an area of prejudice, stereotypes and superstitions that hinder the achievement of full autonomy by an individual (Cichocki, Karłowicz 2019). Contemporary liberalism became both an ecumenical and technocratic project (Lilla 2017; Zakaria 2018). If it was unable to change the world, it decided to change people themselves. From this point of view, the monopoly of liberalism began to resemble the monopoly of a non-democratic regime, for which cultural policy serves a utilitarian function. And cultural policy itself can then be strongly paternalistic. This may be accompanied by populist phenomena, but populism is understood here as an expression of the desire to correct the policy of oligarchic elites, as well as an inertial, demagogic rebellion of the people. Contemporary democracies are characterized by a growing share of emotions in social and political life, therefore, culture as an area for producing experiences and emotions has become a natural point of reference for efforts aimed at destroying the old and build a new social order. A consequence of the described situation may be a suggestion/requirement on the part of the public authorities to implement those directions of art which, first of all, meet the expectations of those in power and fit into the postulated world view. This is to be achieved by financing projects that shape so-defined imagination, while at the same time rationing what opposes the values defined by the given political regime. Another parallel between what is democratic and what is non-democratic is progressive synonymity of the notions of policy and politics, because a specific public policy no longer plays a role in the sphere of culture in organizing and managing the output of artists and its transmission to the audience, but is a utilitarian tool to strengthen real power over the society. It is, therefore, worth considering whether this phenomenon gradually reduces conventional differences between the democratic and non-democratic regimes. The research challenge here is especially majority democracies, which tend to impose cultural formats on minorities, justifying this with the scale of the dominant representativeness of power and value in society. It can be predicted that domination of conflict as a consequence of the growing social polarization, on theoretical grounds expressed by rejecting the universal cognitive value of the liberal-democratic model, will be a response to the growing ideological opposites, assuming a material possibility of creating a different democratic order. In these circumstances, cultural policy will serve to create a new language of confrontation with a specific political character. However, it will probably not be a language facilitating normal communication, as it will be authoritative in nature, which will make it difficult to agree and understand each other.